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Abstract 
Although replication is a central tenet of science, direct replications are rare in psychology. This 
research tested variation in the replicability of thirteen classic and contemporary effects across 36 
independent samples totaling 6,344 participants. In the aggregate, ten effects replicated consistently. 
One effect – imagined contact reducing prejudice – showed weak support for replicability. And two 
effects – flag priming influencing conservatism and currency priming influencing system 
justification – did not replicate. We compared whether the conditions such as lab versus online or 
U.S. versus international sample predicted effect magnitudes. By and large they did not. The results 
of this small sample of effects suggest that replicability is more dependent on the effect itself than 
on the sample and setting used to investigate the effect.  
Word Count = 121 words 
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Investigating variation in replicability: A “Many Labs” Replication Project 
Replication is a central tenet of science; its purpose is to confirm the accuracy of empirical 
findings, clarify the conditions under which an effect can be observed, and estimate the true effect 
size (Brandt et al., 2013; Open Science Collaboration, 2012, 2013). Successful replication of an 
experiment requires the recreation of the essential conditions of the initial experiment. This is often 
easier said than done. There may be an enormous number of variables influencing experimental 
results, and yet only a few tested. In the behavioral sciences, many effects have been observed in 
one cultural context, but not observed in others. Likewise, individuals within the same society, or 
even the same individual at different times (Bodenhausen, 1990), may differ in ways that moderate 
any particular result.  
Direct replication is infrequent, resulting in a published literature that sustains spurious 
findings (Ioannidis, 2005) and a lack of identification of the eliciting conditions for an effect. While 
there are good epistemological reasons for assuming that observed phenomena generalize across 
individuals and contexts in the absence of contrary evidence, the failure to directly replicate 
findings is problematic for theoretical and practical reasons. Failure to identify moderators and 
boundary conditions of an effect may result in overly broad generalizations of true effects across 
situations (Cesario, 2013) or across individuals (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Similarly, 
overgeneralization may lead observations made under laboratory observations to be inappropriately 
extended to ecological contexts that differ in important ways (Henry, MacLeod, Phillips, & 
Crawford, 2004). Practically, attempts to closely replicate research findings can reveal important 
differences in what is considered a direct replication (Schimdt, 2009), thus leading to refinements of 
the initial theory (e.g., Aronson, 1992, Greenwald et al., 1986). Close replication can also lead to 
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the clarification of tacit methodological knowledge that is necessary to elicit the effect of interest 
(Collins, 1974).  
Overview of the Present Research 
Little attempt has been made to assess the variation in replicability of findings across 
samples and research contexts. This project examines the variation in replicability of thirteen classic 
and contemporary psychological effects across 36 samples and settings. Some of the selected effects 
are known to be highly replicable; for others, replicability is unknown. Some may depend on social 
context or participant sample, others may not. We bundled the selected studies together into a brief, 
easy-to-administer experiment that was delivered to each participating sample through a single 
infrastructure (http://projectimplicit.net/). 
There are many factors that can influence the replicability of an effect such as sample, 
setting, statistical power, and procedural variations. The present design standardizes procedural 
characteristics and ensures appropriate statistical power in order to examine the effects of sample 
and setting on replicability. At one extreme, sample and situational characteristics might have little 
effect on the tested effects – variation in effect magnitudes may not exceed expected random error. 
At the other extreme, effects might be highly contextualized – for example, replicating only with 
sample and situational characteristics that are highly consistent with the original circumstances. The 
primary contribution of this investigation is to establish a paradigm for testing replicability across 
samples and settings and provide a rich data set that allows the determinants of replicability to be 
explored. A secondary purpose is to demonstrate support for replicability for the thirteen chosen 
effects. Ideally, the results will stimulate theoretical developments about the conditions under which 
replication will be robust to the inevitable variation in circumstances of data collection.  
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Method 
Researcher Recruitment and Data Collection Sites 
Project leads posted a call for collaborators to the online forum of the Open Science 
Collaboration on February 21, 2013 and to the SPSP Discussion List on July 13, 2013. Other 
colleagues were contacted personally. For inclusion, each replication team had to: (1) follow local 
ethical procedures, (2) administer the protocol as specified, (3) collect data from at least 80 
participants, (4) post a video simulation of the setting and administration procedure, and (5) 
document key features of recruiting, sample, and any changes to the standard protocol. In total, 
there were 36 samples and settings that collected data from a total of 6,344 participants (27 data 
collections in a laboratory and 9 conducted online; 25 from the U.S., 11 from other countries; see 
Table 1 for a brief description of sites and Table S1
1
 for a full descriptions of sites, site 
characteristics, and participant characteristics by site). 
Selection of Replication Studies 
 Twelve studies producing thirteen effects were chosen based on the following criteria: 
1 Suitability for online presentation. Our primary concern was to give each study a “fair” 
replication that was true to the original design. By administering the study through a web 
browser, we were able to ensure procedural consistency across sites.  
2 Length of study. We selected studies that could be administered quickly so that we could 
examine many of them in a single study session.  
3 Simple Design: With the exception of one correlation study, we selected studies that 
featured a simple, two-condition design. 
 
                                                 
1
 Table names that begin with the prefix “S” (e.g., Table S1) refer to tables that can be found in the supplementary 
materials. Tables with no prefix are in this manuscript. 
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4 Diversity of effects. We sought to diversify the sample of effects by topic, time period of 
original investigation, and differing levels of certainty and existing impact. Justification for 
study inclusion is described in the registered proposal (http://osf.io/project/aBEsQ/). 
The Replication Studies 
All replication studies were translated into the dominant language of the country of data 
collection (N = 7 languages total; 3/6 translations from English were back-translated). Next, we 
provide a brief description of each experiment, original finding, and known differences between 
original and replication studies. Most original studies were conducted with paper and pencil, all 
replications were conducted via computer. Exact wording for each study, including a link to the 
study, can be found in the supplementary materials. The relevant findings from the original studies 
can be found in the original proposal. 
1 Sunk costs (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). Sunk costs are those that have 
already been incurred and cannot be recovered (Knox & Inkster, 1968). Oppenheimer et al. 
(2009; adapted from Thaler, 1985) asked participants to imagine that they have tickets to see 
their favorite football team play an important game, but that it is freezing cold on the day of 
the game. Participants rated their likelihood of attending the game on a 9-point scale (1 = 
definitely stay at home, 9 = definitely go to the game). Participants were marginally more 
likely to go to the game if they had paid for the ticket than if the ticket had been free.  
2 Gain versus loss framing (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The original research showed that 
changing the focus from losses to gains decreases participants’ willingness to take risks - 
i.e., gamble to get a better outcome rather than take a guaranteed result. Participants 
imagined that the U.S. was preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Participants were then asked to select a course of action to 
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combat the disease from logically identical sets of alternatives framed in terms of gains as 
follows: Program A will save 200 people [400 people will die], or Program B which has a 
1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved [nobody will die] and 2/3 probability that no 
people will be saved [600 people will die]. In the “gain” framing condition, participants are 
more likely to adopt Program A, while this effect reverses in the loss framing condition. The 
replication replaced the phrase “the United States” with the country of data collection, and 
the word “Asian” was omitted from “an unusual Asian disease”. 
3 Anchoring (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995). Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995) presented a 
number of scenarios in which participants estimated size or distance after first receiving a 
number that was clearly too large or too small. In the original study, participants answered 3 
questions about each of 15 topics for which they estimated a quantity. First, they indicated if 
the quantity was greater or less than an anchor value. Second, they estimated the quantity. 
Third, they indicated their confidence in their estimate. The original number served as an 
anchor, biasing estimates to be closer to it. For the purposes of the replication we provided 
anchoring information before asking just for the estimated quantity for four of the topics 
from the original study – distance from San Francisco to New York City, population of 
Chicago, height of Mt. Everest, and babies born per day in the U.S. For countries that use 
the metric system, we converted anchors to metric units and rounded them.  
4 Retrospective gambler’s fallacy (Oppenheimer & Monin, 2009). Oppenheimer and Monin 
(2009) investigated whether the rarity of an independent, chance observation influenced 
beliefs about what occurred before that event. Participants imagined that they saw a man 
rolling dice in a casino. In one condition, participants imagined witnessing three dice being 
rolled and all came up 6’s. In a second condition two came up 6’s and one came up 3. In a 
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third condition, two dice were rolled and both came up 6’s. All participants then estimated, 
in an open-ended format, how many times the man had rolled the dice before they entered 
the room to watch him. Participants estimated that the man rolled dice more times when they 
had seen him roll three 6’s than when they had seem him roll two 6’s or two 6’s and a 3. For 
the replication, the condition in which the man rolls two 6’s was removed leaving two 
conditions.  
5 Low-vs.-high category scales (Schwarz, Hippler, Deutsch, & Strack, 1985). Schwarz and 
colleagues (1985) demonstrated that people infer from response options what are low and 
high frequencies of a behavior, and self-assess accordingly. In the original demonstration, 
participants were asked how much TV they watch daily on a low-frequency scale ranging 
from “up to half an hour” to “more than two and a half hours”, or a high-frequency scale 
ranging from “up to two and a half hours” to “more than four and a half hours”. In the low-
frequency condition, fewer participants reported watching TV for more than two and a half 
hours than in the high-frequency condition.  
6 Norm of reciprocity (Hyman & Sheatsley, 1950). When confronted with a decision about 
allowing or denying the same behavior to an ingroup and outgroup, people may feel an 
obligation to reciprocity, or consistency in their evaluation of the behaviors (Hyman & 
Sheatsley, 1950). In the original study, American participants answered two questions: 
whether communist countries should allow American reporters in and allow them to report 
the news back to American papers and whether America should allow communist reporters 
into the United States and allow them to report back to their papers. Participants reported 
more support for allowing communist reporters into America when that question was asked 
after the question about allowing American reporters into the communist countries. In the 
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replication, we changed the question slightly to ensure the “other country” was a suitable, 
modern target (North Korea). For international replication, the target country was 
determined by the researcher heading that replication to ensure suitability (see 
supplementary materials). 
7 Allowed/Forbidden (Rugg, 1941). Question phrasing can influence responses. Rugg (1941) 
found that respondents were less likely to endorse forbidding speeches against democracy 
than they were to not endorse allowing speeches against democracy. Respondents in the 
United States were asked, in one condition, if the U.S. should allow speeches against 
democracy or, in another condition, whether the U.S. should forbid speeches against 
democracy. 62 percent of participants indicated “No” when asked if speeches against 
democracy should be allowed, but only 46 percent indicated “Yes” when asked if these 
speeches should be forbidden. In the replication, the words “The United States” were 
replaced with the name of the country the study was administered in.  
8 Quote Attribution (Lorge & Curtis, 1936). The source of information has a great impact on 
how that information is perceived and evaluated. Lorge and Curtis (1936) examined how an 
identical quote would be perceived if it was attributed to a liked or disliked individual. 
Participants were asked to rate their agreement with a list of quotations. The quotation of 
interest was, “I hold it that a little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and as necessary 
in the political world as storms are in the physical world.” In one condition the quote was 
attributed to Thomas Jefferson, a liked individual, and in the other it was attributed to 
Vladimir Lenin, a disliked individual. More agreement was observed when the quote was 
attributed to Jefferson than Lenin (reported in Moskowitz, 2004). In the replication, we used 
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a quote attributed to either George Washington (liked individual) or Osama Bin Laden 
(disliked individual).  
9 Flag Priming (Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin, 2011; Study 2). The American flag is a 
powerful symbol in American culture. Carter et al. (2011) examined how subtle exposure to 
the flag may increase conservatism among U.S. participants. Participants were presented 
with four photos and asked to estimate the time of day at which they were taken. In the flag-
prime condition, the American flag appeared in two of these photos. In the control condition, 
the same photos were presented without flags. Following the manipulation, participants 
completed an 8-item questionnaire assessing views toward various political issues (e.g., 
abortion, gun control, affirmative action). Participants in the flag-primed condition indicated 
significantly more conservative positions than those in the control condition. The priming 
stimuli used to replicate this finding were obtained from the authors and identical to those 
used in the original study. Because it was impractical to edit the images with unique national 
flags, the American flag was always used as a prime. As a consequence, the replications in 
the United States were the only ones considered as direct replications. For international 
replications, the survey questions were adapted slightly to ensure they were appropriate for 
the political climate of the country, as judged by the researcher heading that particular 
replication (see supplementary materials). Further, the original authors suggested possible 
moderators that they have considered since publication of the original study. We included 
three items at the very end of the replication study to test these moderators: (1) How much 
do you identify with being American? (1, not at all – 11, very much), (2) To what extent do 
you think the typical American is a Republican or Democrat? (1, Democrat – 7, 
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Republican), (3) To what extent do you think the typical American is conservative or 
liberal? (1, Liberal – 7, Conservative). 
10 Currency priming (Caruso, Vohs, Baxter, & Waytz, 2013). Money is a powerful symbol. 
Caruso et al. (2013) provide evidence that merely exposing participants to money increases 
their endorsement of the current social system. Participants were first presented with 
demographic questions, with the background of the page manipulated between subjects. In 
one condition the background showed a faint picture of U.S. $100 bills; in the other 
condition the background was a blurred, unidentifiable version of the same picture. Next, 
participants completed an 8-question “system justification scale” (Kay & Jost, 2003). 
Participants in the money-prime condition scored higher on the system justification scale 
than those in the control condition. The authors provided the original materials allowing us 
to construct a near identical replication for U.S. participants. However, the stimuli were 
modified for international replications in two ways: First, the U.S. dollar was usually 
replaced with the relevant country’s currency (see supplementary materials); Second, the 
system-justification questions were adapted to reflect the name of the relevant country. 
11 Imagined contact (Husnu & Crisp, 2010; Study 1). Recent evidence suggests that merely 
imagining contact with members of ethnic outgroups is sufficient to reduce prejudice toward 
those groups (Turner, Crisp, & Lambert, 2007). In Husnu and Crisp (2010), British non-
Muslim participants were assigned to either imagine interacting with a British Muslim 
stranger or to imagine that they were walking outdoors (control condition). Participants 
imagined the scene for one minute, and then described their thoughts for an additional 
minute before indicating their interest and willingness to interact with British Muslims on a 
four item scale. Participants in the “imagined contact” group had significantly higher contact 
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intentions than participants in the control group. In the replication, the word “British” was 
removed from all references to “British Muslims”. Additionally, for the predominately 
Muslim sample from Turkey the items were adapted so Christians were the outgroup target.   
12 Sex differences in implicit math attitudes (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). As a possible 
account for the sex gap in participation in science and math, Nosek and colleagues (2002) 
found that women had more negative implicit attitudes toward math compared to arts than 
men did in two studies of Yale undergraduates. Participants completed four Implicit 
Association Tests (IATs) in random order, one of which measured associations of math and 
arts with positivity and negativity. The replication simplified the design for length to be just 
a single IAT. 
13 Implicit math attitudes relations with self-reported attitudes (Nosek et al., 2002). In the same 
study as Effect 12, self-reported math attitudes were measured with a composite of feeling 
thermometers and semantic differential ratings, and the composite was positively related 
with the implicit measure. The replication used a subset of the explicit items (see 
supplementary materials). 
Procedure 
The experiments were implemented on the Project Implicit infrastructure and all data were 
automatically recorded in a central database with a code identifying the sample source. After a 
paragraph of introduction, the studies were presented in a randomized order, except that the math 
IAT and associated explicit measures were always the final study. After the studies, participants 
completed an instructional manipulation check (IMC; Oppenheimer et al., 2009), a short 
demographic questionnaire, and then the moderator measures for flag priming. See Table S1 for 
IMC and summary demographic information by site. The IMC was not analyzed further for this 
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report. Each replication team had a private link for their participants, and they coordinated their own 
data collection. Experimenters in laboratory studies were not aware of participant condition for each 
task, and did not interact with participants during data collection unless participants had questions. 
Investigators who led replications at specific sites completed a questionnaire about the experimental 
setting (responses summarized in Table S1), and details and videos of each setting along with the 
actual materials, links to run the study, supplemental tables, datasets, and original proposal are 
available at http://osf.io/project/WX7Ck/. 
Confirmatory Analysis Plan                                       
Prior to data collection we specified a confirmatory analysis plan. All confirmatory analyses 
are reported either in text or in supplementary materials. A few of the tasks produced highly erratic 
distributions (particularly anchoring) requiring revisions to those analysis plans. A summary of 
differences between the original plans and actual analysis is reported in the supplementary 
materials.  
Results 
Summary Results 
 Figure 1 presents an aggregate summary of replications of the thirteen effects, presenting 
each of the four anchoring effects separately. Table 2 presents the original effect size, median effect 
size, weighted and unweighted effect size and 99% confidence intervals, and proportion of samples 
that rejected the null hypothesis in the expected and unexpected direction. In the aggregate, 10 of 
the 13 studies replicated the original results with varying distance from the original effect size. One 
study, imagined contact, showed a significant effect in the expected direction in just 4 of the 36 
samples (and once in the wrong direction), but the confidence intervals for the aggregate effect size 
suggest that it is slightly different than zero. Two studies – flag priming and currency priming – did 
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not replicate the original effects. Each of these had just one p-value < .05 and it was in the wrong 
direction for flag priming. The aggregate effect size was near zero whether using the median, 
weighted mean, or unweighted mean. All confidence intervals included zero. Figure 1 presents all 
36 samples for flag priming, but only U.S. data collections were counted for the confirmatory 
analysis (see Table 2). International samples also did not show a flag priming effect (weighted mean 
= .03, 99% CI [-.04, .10]). To rule out the possibility that the priming effects were contaminated by 
the contents of other experimental materials, we reexamined only those participants who completed 
these tasks first. Again, there was no effect (Flag Priming: t(431) = 0.33, p = .75; Currency Priming: 
t(605) = -0.56, p = .57).
2
  
 When an effect size for the original study could be calculated, it is presented as an “X” in 
Figure 1. For three effects (contact, flag priming, and currency priming), the original effect is larger 
than for any sample in the present study, with the observed median or mean effect at or below the 
lower bound of the 95% confidence interval for the original effect.
3
 Though the sex difference in 
implicit math attitudes effect was within the 95% confidence interval of the original result, the 
replication estimate combined with another large-scale replication (Nosek & Smyth, 2011) suggests 
that the original effect was an overestimate.  
Variation Across Samples and Settings 
 Figure 1 demonstrates substantial variation for some of the observed effects. That variation 
could be a function of the true effect size, random error, sample differences, or setting differences. 
Comparing the intra-class correlation of samples across effects (ICC = .005; F(35,385) = 1.06, p = 
.38) with the intra-class correlation of effects across samples (ICC = .75; F(12,420) = 110.62, p 
                                                 
2
 None of the effects was moderated by which position in the study procedure it was administered.  
3
 The original anchoring report did not distinguish between topics so the aggregate effect size is 
reported. 
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<.001) suggests that very little in the variability of effect sizes can be attributed to the samples, and 
substantial variability is attributable to the effect under investigation. To illustrate, Figure 2 shows 
the same data as Figure 1 organized by sample rather than by effect. There is almost no variation in 
the average effect size across samples.  
However, it is possible that particular samples would elicit larger magnitudes for some 
effects and smaller magnitudes for others. That might be missed by the aggregate analyses. Table 3 
presents tests of whether the heterogeneity of effect sizes for each effect exceeds what is expected 
by measurement error. Cochran’s Q and I^2 statistics revealed that heterogeneity of effect sizes was 
largely observed among the very large effects - anchoring, allowed-forbidden, and relations 
between implicit and explicit attitudes. Only one other effect - quote attribution - showed substantial 
heterogeneity. This appears to be partly attributable to this effect occurring more strongly in U.S. 
samples and to a lesser degree in international samples.  
 To test for moderation by key characteristics of the setting, we conducted a condition X 
country (US or other) X location (lab or online) ANOVA for each effect. Table 3 presents the 
essential condition X country and condition X location effects. Full model results are available in 
supplementary materials. A total of 10 of the 32 moderation tests were significant, and seven of 
those were among the largest effects – anchoring and allowed-forbidden. Even including those, 
none of the moderation effect sizes exceeded a partial eta-squared of .022. The heterogeneity in 
anchoring effects may be attributable to differences in knowledge of the height of Mt Everest, 
distance to NYC, or population of Chicago between the samples. Overall, whether the sample was 
collected in the U.S. or elsewhere, or whether data collection occurred on-line or in the laboratory, 
had little systematic effect on the observed results.  
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 Additional possible moderators of the flag priming effect were suggested by the original 
authors. On the U.S. participants only (N~4670), with five hierarchical regression models, we tested 
whether the items moderated the effect of the manipulation. They did not (p’s = .48, .80, .62, .07, 
.05). Details available in the online supplement. 
Discussion 
 A large scale replication with 36 samples successfully replicated eleven of thirteen classic 
and contemporary effects in psychological science, some of which are well-known to be robust, and 
others that have been replicated infrequently or not at all. The original studies produced 
underestimates of some effects (e.g., anchoring-and-adjustment and allowed versus forbidden 
message framing), and overestimates of other effects (e.g., imagined contact producing willingness 
to interact with outgroups in the future). Two effects – flag priming influencing conservatism and 
currency priming influencing system justification – did not replicate.  
 A primary goal of this investigation was to examine the heterogeneity of effect sizes by the 
wide variety of samples and settings, and to provide an example of a paradigm for testing such 
variation. Some studies were conducted on-line, others in the laboratory. Some studies were 
conducted in the United States, others elsewhere. And, a wide variety of educational institutions 
took part. Surprisingly, these factors did not produce highly heterogeneous effect sizes. Intraclass 
correlations suggested that most of the variation in effects was due to the effect under investigation 
and almost none to the particular sample used. Focused tests of moderating influences elicited 
sporadic and small effects of the setting, while tests of heterogeneity suggested that most of the 
variation in effects is attributable to measurement error. Further, heterogeneity was mostly restricted 
to the largest effects in the sample – counter to an intuition that small effects would be the most 
likely to be variable across sample and setting. Further, the lack of heterogeneity is particularly 
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interesting considering that there is substantial interest and commentary about the contingency of 
effects on our two moderators, lab versus online (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava & John, 2004; 
Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis, 2010), and cultural variation across nations (Henrich et al., 2010).  
All told, the main conclusion from this small sample of studies is that, to predict effect size, 
it is much more important to know what effect is being studied than to know the sample or setting in 
which it is being studied. The key virtue of the present investigation is that the study procedure was 
highly standardized across data collection settings, and samples were 80 participants or larger, 
ensuring appropriate power for detecting the effects under investigation. This minimized the 
likelihood that factors other than sample and setting contributed to systematic variation in effects. 
At the same time, this conclusion is surely constrained by the small, non-random sample of studies 
represented here. Additionally, the replication sites included in this project cannot capture all 
possible cultural variation, and most societies sampled were relatively Western, Educated, 
Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD; Henrich et al., 2010). Nonetheless, the present 
investigation suggests that we should not necessarily assume that there are differences between 
samples; indeed, even when moderation was observed in this sample, the effects were still quite 
robust in each setting.  
The present investigation provides a summary analysis of a very large, rich dataset. This 
dataset will be useful for additional exploratory analysis about replicability in general, and these 
effects in particular. The data are available for download at the Open Science Framework 
(http://osf.io/project/WX7Ck/). 
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Conclusion 
 This investigation offered novel insights into variation in the replicability of psychological 
effects, and specific information about the replicability of 13 effects. This methodology – 
crowdsourcing dozens of laboratories running an identical procedure – can be adapted for a variety 
of investigations. It allows for increased confidence in the existence of an effect and for the 
investigation of an effect’s dependence on the particular circumstances of data collection (Open 
Science Collaboration, 2013). Further, a consortium of laboratories could provide mutual support 
for each other by conducting similar large-scale investigations on original research questions, not 
just replications. Thus, collective effort could accelerate the identification and verification of extant 
and novel psychological effects. 
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Table 1. Data Collection Sites 
Site 
identifier 
Location N 
Online (O) 
or Lab (L) 
US or 
International (I) 
Abington Penn State Abington, Abington, PA 84 L US 
Brasilia University of Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil 120 L I 
Charles Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic 84 L I 
Conncoll Connecticut College, New London, CT 95 L US 
CSUN California State University, Northridge, LA, CA 96 O US 
Help HELP University, Malaysia 102 L I 
Ithaca Ithaca College, Ithaca, NY 90 L US 
JMU James Madison University, Harrisonburg, VA 174 O US 
KU Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey 113 O I 
Laurier Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada 112 L I 
LSE 
London School of Economics and Political Science, 
London, UK 
277 L I 
Luc Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL 146 L US 
McDaniel McDaniel College, Westminster, MD 98 O US 
MSVU 
Mount Saint Vincent University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 
Canada 
85 L I 
MTURK Amazon Mechanical Turk (US workers only) 1000 O US 
OSU Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 107 L US 
Oxy Occidental College, LA, CA 123 L US 
PI Project Implicit Volunteers (US citizens/residents only) 1329 O US 
PSU Penn State University, University Park, PA 95 L US 
QCCUNY Queens College, City University of New York, NY 103 L US 
QCCUNY2 Queens College, City University of New York, NY 86 L US 
SDSU SDSU, San Diego, CA 162 L US 
SWPS 
University of Social Sciences and Humanities Campus 
Sopot, Sopot, Poland 
79 L I 
SWPSON Volunteers visiting www.badania.net 169 O I 
TAMU Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 187 L US 
TAMUC Texas A&M University-Commerce, Commerce, TX 87 L US 
TAMUON 
Texas A&M University, College Station, TX (Online 
participants) 
225 O US 
Tilburg Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands 80 L I 
UFL University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 127 L US 
UNIPD University of Padua, Padua, Italy 144 O I 
UVA University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 81 L US 
VCU VCU, Richmond, VA 108 L US 
Wisc University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 96 L US 
WKU Western Kentucky University, Bowling Green, KY 103 L US 
WL Washington & Lee University, Lexington, VA 90 L US 
WPI Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA 87 L US 
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Table 2. Summary Confirmatory Results for Original and Replicated Effects 
 
Original Study 
 
Unweighted Weighted 
Null Hypothesis Significance Tests by 
Sample (N = 36) 
Null Hypothesis Significance Tests 
of Aggregate 
Effect ES 
95% CI 
Lower, 
Upper 
Median 
Replication 
ES 
Replication 
ES 
99% CI 
Lower, 
Upper 
Replication 
ES 
99% CI 
Lower, 
Upper 
Proportion 
<0 (p<.05) 
Proportion 
>0 (p<.05) 
Proportion 
ns 
Key 
statistics df N p 
Anchoring - Babies 
Born 0.93 
.51, 
1.33 2.43 2.60 
2.41, 
2.79 2.42 
2.33, 
2.51 0.00 1.00 0.00 t = 90.49 5607 5609 <.001 
Anchoring - Mt. 
Everest 0.93 
.51, 
1.33 2.00 2.45 
2.12, 
2.77 2.23 
2.14, 
2.32 0.00 1.00 0.00 t = 83.66 5625 5627 <.001 
Allowed/Forbidden 0.65 
.57,  
.73 1.88 1.87 
1.58, 
2.16 1.96 
1.88, 
2.04 0.00 0.97 0.03 χ2 = 3088.7 1 6292 <.001 
Anchoring - 
Chicago 0.93 
.51, 
1.33 1.88 2.05 
1.84, 
2.25 1.79 
1.71, 
1.87 0.00 1.00 0.00 t = 65.00 5282 5284 <.001 
Anchoring - 
Distance to NYC 0.93 
.51, 
1.33 1.18 1.27 
1.13, 
1.40 1.17 
1.09, 
1.25 0.00 1.00 0.00 t = 42.86 5360 5362 <.001 
Relations between I 
and E math attitudes 0.93 
.77, 
1.08 0.84 0.79 
0.63, 
0.96 0.79 
0.75, 
0.83 0.00 0.94 0.06 r = .38 
 
5623 <.001 
Retrospective 
gambler fallacy 0.69 
.16, 
1.21 0.61 0.59 
0.49, 
0.70 0.61 
0.54, 
0.68 0.00 0.83 0.17 t = 24.01 5940 5942 <.001 
Gain vs loss framing 1.13 
.89, 
1.37 0.58 0.62 
0.52, 
0.71 0.60 
0.53, 
0.67 0.00 0.86 0.14 χ2 = 516.4 1 6271 <.001 
Sex differences in 
implicit math 
attitudes 1.01 
.54, 
1.48 0.59 0.56 
0.45, 
0.68 0.53 
0.46, 
0.60 0.00 0.71 0.29 t = 19.28 5840 5842 <.001 
Low vs high 
category scales 0.50 
.15, 
.84 0.50 0.51 
0.42,  
0.61 0.49 
0.40, 
0.58 0.00 0.67 0.33 χ2 = 342.4 1 5899 <.001 
Quote Attribution na 
 
0.30 0.31 
0.19, 
0.42 0.32 
0.25, 
0.39 0.00 0.47 0.53 t = 12.79 6323 6325 <.001 
Norm of reciprocity 0.16 
.06, 
.27 0.27 0.27 
0.18, 
0.36 0.30 
0.23, 
0.37 0.00 0.36 0.64 χ2 = 135.3 1 6276 <.001 
Sunk Costs 0.23 
-.04, 
.50 0.32 0.31 
0.22, 
0.39 0.27 
0.20, 
0.34 0.00 0.50 0.50 t = 10.83 6328 6330 <.001 
Imagined contact 0.86 
.14, 
1.57 0.12 0.10 
0.00, 
0.19 0.13 
0.07, 
0.19 0.03 0.11 0.86 t = 5.05 6334 6336 <.001 
Flag Priming 0.50 
.01, 
.99 0.02 0.01 
-0.07, 
0.08 0.03 
-0.04, 
0.10 0.04 0.00 0.96 t = 0.88 4894 4896 0.38 
Currency Priming 0.80 
.05, 
1.54 0.00 0.01 
-0.06, 
0.09 -0.02 
-0.08, 
0.04 0.00 0.03 0.97 t = -0.79 6331 6333 0.83 
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Notes: All effect sizes (ES) presented in Cohen's d units. Weighted statistics are computed on the whole aggregated dataset (N>6000); Unweighted statistics are computed on the 
disaggregated dataset (N=36). 95% CI's for original effect sizes used cell sample sizes when available and assumed equal distribution across conditions when not available. The original 
anchoring article did not provide sufficient information to calculate effect sizes for individual scenarios, therefore an overall effect size is reported. The Anchoring original effect size is a 
mean point-biserial correlation computed across 15 different questions in a test-retest design, whereas the present replication adopted a between-subjects design with random assignments. 
One sample was removed from sex difference and relations between implicit and explicit math attitudes because of a systemic error in that laboratory's recording of reaction times. Flag 
priming includes only U.S. samples. Confidence intervals around the unweighted mean are based on the central normal distribution. Confidence intervals around the weighted effect size 
are based on non-central distributions.  
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Table 3. Tests of Effect Size Heterogeneity 
 
Heterogeneity statistics Moderation tests 
Effect Q DF p I^2 
US or 
International p partial η2 
Lab or 
online p partial eta-sq 
Anchoring - Babies Born 59.71 35 0.01 0.402 0.16 0.69 0.00 16.14 <0.01 0.00 
Anchoring - Mt. Everest 152.34 35 <.0001 0.754 94.33 <0.01 0.02 119.56 <0.01 0.02 
Allowed/Forbidden 180.40 35 <.0001 0.756 70.37 <0.01 0.01 0.55 0.46 0.00 
Anchoring - Chicago 312.75 35 <.0001 0.913 0.62 0.43 0.00 32.95 <0.01 0.01 
Anchoring - Distance to NYC 88.16 35 <.0001 0.643 9.35 <0.01 0.00 15.74 <0.01 0.00 
Relations between I and E math attitudes 54.84 34 <.0001 0.401 0.41* 0.52 <.001* 2.80* 0.09 <.001* 
Retrospective gambler fallacy 50.83 35 0.04 0.229 0.40 0.53 0.00 0.34 0.56 0.00 
Gain vs loss framing 37.01 35 0.37 0.0001 0.09 0.76 0.00 1.11 0.29 0.00 
Sex differences in implicit math attitudes 47.60 34 0.06 0.201 0.82 0.37 0.00 1.07 0.30 0.00 
Low vs high category scales 36.02 35 0.42 0.192 0.16 0.69 0.00 0.02 0.88 0.00 
Quote Attribution 67.69 35 <.001 0.521 8.81 <0.01 0.001 0.50 0.48 0.00 
Norm of reciprocity 38.89 35 0.30 0.172 5.76 0.02 0.00 0.64 0.43 0.00 
Sunk Costs 35.55 35 0.44 0.092 0.58 0.45 0.00 0.25 0.62 0.00 
Imagined contact 45.87 35 0.10 0.206 0.53 0.47 0.00 4.88 0.03 0.00 
Flag Priming 30.33 35 0.69 0 0.53 0.47 0.00 1.85 0.17 0.00 
Currency Priming 28.41 35 0.78 0 1.00 0.32 0.00 0.11 0.74 0.00 
 
Notes: Tasks ordered from largest to smallest observed effect size (see Table 2). Heterogeneity tests conducted with R-package metafor. REML was used for estimation for all tests. One 
sample was removed from sex difference and relations between implicit and explicit math attitudes because of a systemic error in that laboratory's recording of reaction times. * 
Moderator statistics are F value of the interaction of condition and the moderator from an ANOVA with condition, country, and location as independent variables with the exception of 
Relations between impl. and expl. math attitudes for is reported the F value associated with the change in R squared after the product term between the independent variable and the 
moderator is added in a hierarchical linear regression model. Details of all analyses are available in the supplement. 
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Figure 1. Replication Results Organized By Effect 
 
 
Notes: “X” indicates the effect size obtained in the original study. Large circles represent the aggregate effect size obtained across all participants. Error bars represent 99% noncentral 
confidence intervals around the effects. Small circles represent the effect sizes obtained within each site (black and white circles for US and international replications, respectively). 
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Figure 2. Replication Results Organized By Site 
 
 
Notes: Gray circles represent the effect size obtained for each effect within a site. Black circles represent the mean effect size obtained within a site. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
interval around the mean. 
 
